The Yamato Dynasty is the first collective biography of the Japanese imperial family, both men and women, covering five generations since the Meiji Restoration in the nineteenth century. When we asked a Japan scholar what he would like to see in our book, he said, "Everything! It has never been done." Well, maybe not everything.

Most books focus on Hirohito and whether he was responsible for the Pacific War, with only passing reference to his empress, his brothers and others. Ours is an effort to portray them all, their personalities, aspirations, disabilities, achievements, failures and fateful relationships, as monarchs of a very different nation that has risen, fallen and risen again to exceptional world power. It is the first biography to benefit from the recent discovery in a warehouse of the diaries of Hirohito's brother, Prince Takamatsu, totalling eight volumes in their first Japanese edition. And from the publication of a memoir by Princess Chichibu, wife of another brother who was regarded as an alternative emperor, and who led a secret life during World War II that we reveal for the first time. Fragments of Hirohito's diaries have also surfaced, but the Imperial Household has tried to suppress them. Wherever possible, we use Japanese sources and authorities.

Clustering this material produces interesting discoveries. Previously, historians neglected the princesses, so until now we have been unaware of a discreet network of Christians around the throne -- centered on Hirohito's mother, Empress Sadako -- and the pivotal role they played in rescuing the imperial family from prosecution for war crimes after World War II. This discovery leads to others.

Though no single book could be a complete and comprehensive history of Japan or of its imperial family, The Yamato Dynasty reflects what we found intriguing during the decades when six of our books were being published in Japan, and one evolved into a major kabuki theater production. The name Yamato comes from a river valley near Kyoto where the imperial house was first established after moving up from Kyushu in prehistoric times. This epoch was called the Yamato Chotei. Japanese sometimes call themselves the Yamato people. Traditionally, they hold that a single dynasty has "reigned unbroken since time immemorial" -- tracing the family lineage back to the Yamato Chotei, before which there is only legend. So we have chosen to call them the Yamato dynasty. They are the world's longest-reigning dynasty. The dynasty may have reigned but it rarely ruled, so we devote equal attention to the strongmen in the shadows behind the throne, and promise a few disturbing surprises. The main entrance to the Kyoto palace is called the Door to Heaven -- the first of many deceptions.

Sterling and Peggy Seagrave, 1999

JUST BEFORE 10 A.M. on September 27, 1945, a maroon 1930 Rolls-Royce with a canvas-covered top whispered out through the Sakurada Gate of the imperial palace in Tokyo and crossed the bridge over its broad moat, followed by three black Daimlers. Japanese pedestrians knew who it was, turned and bowed deeply. Maroon was a color reserved for the emperor's cars. Emperor Hirohito was on his way to a fateful first meeting with Japan's new shogun, General Douglas MacArthur. Sitting on jump seats in the Rolls facing Hirohito -- by custom no subordinate could share the emperor's seat -- were his most senior adviser, Marquis Kido, and a trusted English-language interpreter. In the Daimlers were other members of Hirohito's inner council. The emperor's personal physician accompanied him wherever he went, but on this occasion he had a particular reason: Hirohito was suffering deep depression made worse by jaundice. Since Japan's surrender the previous month, the emperor had slept badly, and today in particular his hands trembled more than usual.

How different from four years earlier, when he had shaken with rage. Then, in September 1941, three months before Pearl Harbor, the emperor had been given a detailed briefing on the High Command's plans for a surprise attack on the United States Navy base and a coordinated lightning conquest of Southeast Asia. Hirohito had asked the army chief of staff, General Sugiyama, how long it would take. Circumspectly, the general had replied that the conquest of Southeast Asia would take only three months. (It took precisely one week longer than that.) But he did not give an estimate for the subduing of America. Testily, Hirohito pointed out that when the war with China had begun in 1937, General Sugiyama had said it would be over in a month, yet it had dragged on for four years and was far from over in the autumn of 1941. Sugiyama protested that China was vast. This increased Hirohito's anger. "If you call the Chinese hinterland vast, would you not describe the Pacific as even more immense?" The general squirmed with embarrassment, and sucked his breath in sharply. Hirohito was calmed only by repeated assurances that a diplomatic settlement with America would get first priority after Japan got the upper hand. In this, his ministers lied, for both the Imperial Army and Navy by then were committed to total war, with no serious intention of quitting while they were ahead. Only a major last-minute concession from America such as dropping its oil embargo of Japan could have altered events, and everyone knew this was unlikely. A formal declaration of war had been prepared long in advance, with the understanding that, "due to a most unfortunate last-minute delay in the English translation," it would not be delivered in Washington until after the attack on Pearl Harbor had already begun.

The mood in all four cars was somber. What could be seen of Tokyo made it worse. The Navy Ministry was nothing but rubble. Bomb craters and bombed-out cars were everywhere. During the Pacific War, 1.5 million Japanese men died in combat. Some 8 million Japanese civilians were killed or wounded, and 2.5 million homes in Japan were destroyed or badly damaged. During the biggest of these B-29 raids on Japan, when 1,700 tons of incendiary bombs were dropped on Tokyo, 100,000 people were killed in a single day and 125,000 homes destroyed. Although the war was now over, it was estimated that 10 million Japanese might yet starve to death. The population of Tokyo had fallen from 6.75 million to about 3 million, many living in shanties among the ruins. Osaka and other cities were teeming with disabled veterans, homeless children, desperate women and vagrants. In Tokyo each day, trucks hauled piles of bodies to crematoriums. At night, the homeless crowded into subways to sleep. Others froze to death sleeping rough in Ueno Park. Many died of malnutrition, and tuberculosis was epidemic.

As the cars sped toward the U.S. embassy compound, there was no military police escort to halt traffic. To put his visitor at a further disadvantage, MacArthur had deliberately avoided assigning an escort to the motorcade. When the traffic light at Toranomon intersection turned red, cross traffic made it necessary for the emperor's Rolls to come to a stop like all the other cars. Nobody in the Daimlers could remember that ever happening before.

MacArthur had been in Japan only a month. He had arrived at Atsugi Air Base from the Philippines at the end of August, two weeks after Japan's surrender. By then, only 6,000 American troops had arrived to take control of the Tokyo area, where there were still some 2 million fully armed Japanese soldiers. The emperor's radio appeal to all Japanese to lay down their arms had been effective. But there was no certainty that fighting would not flare up again. Bluff was all important. More so than anyone realized.

During those first weeks in Japan, MacArthur had been pressed repeatedly to summon the emperor to a private meeting, to resolve certain delicate matters, but MacArthur chose to wait. Conservative policy-makers in Washington, including former president Herbert Hoover, had come to the conclusion that it was crucial for America's future security interests in East Asia to get the behind-the-scenes cooperation of the imperial family, and of powerful financial leaders in Japan -- but not to be seen in public as making any concessions to Hirohito, whose image in the West was as bad as that of General Tojo Hideki, Japan's wartime prime minister. Together, Tojo and Hirohito were widely seen as the driving forces behind the war. Hirohito's name came at or near the top of all lists of prospective war criminals who were to be tried by Allied military tribunals. Through intermediaries, MacArthur let it be known that the emperor must take the initiative, and ask for a meeting with him. Secret negotiations went on through MacArthur's military secretary and former chief of psychological warfare, Brigadier General Bonner Fellers, who had unusual private channels in Japan.

Persuaded by his own family and advisers that such a meeting would be critical to the preservation of the dynasty, Hirohito responded by arranging through Foreign Minister Yoshida to see MacArthur on September 27. Because of the sensitive nature of the meeting, it would take place privately in the general's living quarters at the embassy, rather than at occupation headquarters in the old Dai Ichi Life building opposite the imperial palace.

Despite the unusual secrecy that still surrounds this meeting, both in America and Japan, the superficial details are well known. After passing the Okura Museum, the motorcade turned into the embassy gate and rolled up the drive to the ambassador's residence, where MacArthur was living with his wife and son. General Fellers, waiting with other U.S. Army officers at the entrance portico, stepped out to meet the Rolls as it came to a halt. As Hirohito and Marquis Kido emerged, the Americans saw with some amusement that the emperor had abandoned his customary military uniform and was dressed in 1930s diplomatic attire, with a formal black tail-coat, wing-collar, striped cravat and striped trousers. He was carrying a silk top hat, which he now put squarely on his head, as coached by his chamberlains. At five feet three inches, Hirohito looked small and frail next to the Americans. His mustache and wire-rimmed glasses did nothing to disguise his fragility. He seemed bewildered and tense. General Fellers saluted, then, to put the emperor at ease, smiled warmly and reached out to shake his hand, saying, "Welcome, sir!" Hirohito responded uncertainly by putting out his own hand, an uncharacteristic gesture that would have astonished most Japanese. Not even his most senior adviser, Marquis Kido, ever shook the emperor's hand. As Fellers guided the emperor into the building, Kido tried to stay with them but another American officer politely but firmly asked the marquis to step to one side. Only Hirohito's interpreter was allowed to follow. The rest of the emperor's entourage was herded with Kido into a conference room for their own discussions with Fellers and others. While waiting for the motorcade to arrive, General MacArthur had been moving furniture nervously a few inches this way and that in the deeply carpeted reception room. In front of a fireplace, he put a side chair next to a big chesterfield where he planned to sit with the emperor. This side chair, MacArthur explained to his personal physician, Dr. Roger Egeberg, was there in case the emperor brought along an interpreter, to give him time to think before answering questions. The emperor would not really need an interpreter, MacArthur explained, because as a young man he had gone to school in America and spoke good English. (This amazing remark, recorded at the time by Dr. Egeberg, reveals how little MacArthur really knew about the emperor of Japan, his enemy for the past four years; he may have been thinking of Hirohito's younger brother, Prince Chichibu, who had studied in Britain and spoke elegant English.)

When word came that Hirohito had arrived, MacArthur stepped to the door to greet him, calling him "Your Majesty" and giving him an unsmiling but businesslike handshake. In contrast to the emperor's formal attire, the general had deliberately chosen to wear khaki "suntans" with no hat, no ribbons or insignia of rank, and his collar open wide. A well-briefed U.S. Army photographer was waiting and, as agreed in advance, took three official photos of the general and the emperor. Hirohito stood stiffly at attention, face frozen, arms rigid at his sides, while MacArthur towered over him, at ease, legs apart, arms akimbo and hands jauntily on his hips. This was one of MacArthur's favorite poses. He was a theatrical man who had staged dramatic publicity photographs throughout the war, repeatedly wading ashore at island after island while his favorite photographer took dozens of exposures to get the effect just right.

As they were shown to their seats before the fire, Hirohito chose to sit alone in the side chair, so the general ended up on the chesterfield with the interpreter. This annoyed MacArthur and he badly wanted to smoke, so he leaned forward to offer the emperor an American cigarette. Although Hirohito did not smoke, he was so determined to be positive that he accepted anyway, his hand trembling as the general lit it. He smoked the entire cigarette, without inhaling, while MacArthur puffed at his corncob pipe, and this gave both men a chance to gather their thoughts. A Japanese servant brought coffee rather than the traditional pot of very hot green tea, but the emperor did not touch it. There was speculation later that he was warned to consume nothing for fear of poison, but it is more likely that he was simply too tense to pick up a cup.

MacArthur, who was then 65, opened the conversation by remarking that he had been received by Hirohito's father in 1906, at the close of the Russo-Japanese War. During the forty-minute conversation, the emperor's interpreter made selective notes. His job was to see that whatever the emperor said on the spur of the moment was put so skillfully in English that no nuance could be misconstrued, and conformed with policy decisions made at the palace before the meeting. One copy of his notes later went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and another into the emperor's personal files. Although MacArthur and Hirohito had agreed that their talk would be kept absolutely secret, years later in his memoirs MacArthur quoted the emperor as saying: "I bear sole responsibility for whatever happened, for whatever incidents occurred in conjunction with Japan's prosecution of the war. Furthermore, I bear direct and sole responsibility for every action taken in Japan's name by every commander, every soldier, and every politician. As for my own life, whatever judgment you choose to make, it does not matter to me. I bear sole responsibility." MacArthur grandly concluded that the emperor's willingness to assume responsibility for everything that had gone wrong made him unquestionably "the first gentleman of Japan." In December 1975, a Japanese magazine published what it said were the interpreter's notes. The two versions did not agree. The interpreter's notes made no mention of Hirohito offering to take "sole responsibility." The Japanese people would have liked very much for Hirohito to take some responsibility for the war, and were deeply disappointed when he did not. It is unlikely that a statement of such historic significance would be left out of the written record. Exactly what Hirohito said to MacArthur remains a mystery, unless we believe the general's memory. Given his confusion about Hirohito going to school in America, that is risky. But, as we will see, this was not the only time MacArthur (and others) put words in Hirohito's mouth.

Ten minutes after their meeting was supposed to end, MacArthur and the emperor came out with happy looks on their faces. The general was introduced to the emperor's aides and then escorted Hirohito to his car. On his way back to the palace, the emperor seemed relieved and talked much more than usual. He slept better as well. He was certain now that he could escape arrest or prosecution for war crimes.

What was it that put smiles on their faces so soon after a war without mercy, and the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

Two people who eavesdropped on the meeting were the general's wife Jean and Dr. Egeberg, who -- with MacArthur's full knowledge -- hid behind the red velvet drapes in the reception hall, but later claimed that they only overheard an occasional phrase.

We can eavesdrop in a different way. To read the bare details recounted so far is to see this great turning point with only one eye, in flat two dimensions. We can now open the other eye, for today we know what else was going on. It is a surprising and deeply disturbing story.

The general's chief concern that day, quite naturally, was to ensure his own public success as America's proconsul in Japan, which he hoped would lead to his being chosen by the Republican Party as its candidate for president in the 1948 elections. Becoming president of the United States had obsessed MacArthur since the early 1930s, and had shaped many of his actions.

Liberal Washington policy-makers, particularly New Deal Democrats, wanted to alter the postwar power structure of Japan permanently to make it more democratic. MacArthur was a reactionary conservative, not a liberal by any measure, yet he had to appear to be carrying out Washington's orders. He and his inner circle of advisers, including Herbert Hoover, concluded that his success in occupied Japan would depend upon manipulating Hirohito. The way he went about this would have to be kept absolutely secret because of the methods to be used and the trade-offs involved. He would have to frighten the emperor with the threat of being indicted, prosecuted and hanged (or shot), and then offer to protect him in exchange for his secret collusion. Using carrot and stick, and outright extortion, he would induce Hirohito to give them inside knowledge of Japan's financial cliques and other vital power relationships, so that key people could be put under pressure, deals could be made and Japan's postwar power structure could be rearranged to suit MacArthur's conservative political and financial backers, rather than American liberals.

During those first weeks after the surrender, great effort already was being made to distance the emperor from direct responsibility, for Pearl Harbor in particular, shifting the blame entirely to General Tojo. This had been decided in secret talks between conservative American and Japanese envoys in Switzerland, long before the war ended. To rescue Hirohito, everyone would have to be persuaded that the emperor was "a captive of Tojo and the militarists" who were "exclusively responsible for the war."

In keeping with this strategy, two days before seeing MacArthur, Hirohito said in written replies to questions from a New York Times correspondent that Tojo was responsible for the government's failure to communicate Japan's declaration of war to Washington prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. This was untrue; the delay was a ruse they had all agreed upon in September, long in advance of the attack.

At no time during the remaining forty-four years of his life did Hirohito ever publicly accept personal responsibility for the war, whether for starting it (which angered Americans) or for losing it (which angered Japanese). Marquis Kido became so distressed by Hirohito's refusal to accept responsibility that he privately advised the emperor to abdicate rather than disgrace his ancestors. Hirohito grieved over the tragedy that had befallen his country, but felt no responsibility whatever for the failure of his military commanders, who had assured him of victory repeatedly only to let him down. Although the ultimate decision to continue the war for two more years remained with Hirohito, he saw it as their failure, not his.

The rescue of Hirohito would have to be drawn out over several years. If he was exonerated too quickly, he could slip off the hook. Whenever he became obstinate, evasive or hesitant, MacArthur would frighten him with word of new demands for his prosecution, from Congress, from the Allies or -- most dreaded of all -- from the Kremlin. To be sure, this extortion would have to be carried out with great tact and subtlety. But MacArthur had long experience of being vague and oblique.

Indeed, as they left the embassy in the Rolls, Hirohito told Marquis Kido that MacArthur had said: "I believe Your Majesty knows about the people and important men in the [Japanese] political world, so from now on, I would like to have your advice on various matters."

In what follows, we will unfold new evidence of the massive fraud that ensued, who was involved, and how major witnesses including General Tojo himself were suborned by MacArthur's staff and forced to falsify their testimony and perjure themselves before the international war crimes tribunal. At least one general was hanged for a crime at which he was not even present, forced to take the fall to protect Hirohito's uncle Prince Asaka, the butcher of Nanking, who escaped punishment of any kind. But it did not stop there. Soon matters got completely out of hand.

Mistakenly, MacArthur and his inner circle thought it was enough to take the emperor himself hostage. They got it wrong. Real power in Japan remained in the shadows. He could squeeze the emperor like a lemon till his pips squeaked, but the real power-brokers felt no pain. They watched from the wings and from backstage, and figured out what MacArthur was really after. The secret exorcism of Hirohito involved a lot of horse trading, which was skillfully used by Japanese negotiators. Once they had participated with MacArthur and his aides in perjuring witnesses to rescue the emperor, they could pressure MacArthur repeatedly for the rescue of others. This led first to the exoneration of the whole imperial family, then to that of the entire financial and industrial elite of Japan (a group that had been the Allies' explicit target for purge and prosecution). All the big Japanese banks and zaibatsu financial cliques that had bankrolled the war were originally to be dissolved, but were let off. They were excused from paying war reparations on the argument that Japan was "bankrupt." While Germany paid some \\a16330 billion in compensation and reparations over the years, Japan paid only \\a1632 billion. Even today, Germany continues this program of compensation and reparations, but Japan dug in its heels and said it was all settled in 1951. Instead of encouraging the democratization of Japan and the growth of alternative political parties, MacArthur thwarted opposition groups, clamped down on postwar labor unrest and jailed any and all demonstrators. Next came freedom for all the indicted war criminals locked up in Sugamo Prison, including underworld figures who had participated in the looting of billions of dollars in treasure from a dozen conquered countries. Finally, there was exoneration for all the 220,000 people who were initially blacklisted by America for their roles in the war. It may not have been MacArthur's original intention to let all these people off, but once the emperor's advisers realized what the general wanted, it was a simple matter to take advantage, patiently, step by step. Extortion can work both ways.

Most Japanese learned about the private meeting between the emperor and the general only when MacArthur insisted on publication of the photo in every major newspaper in Japan. This caused an uproar because it made the formally attired emperor look absurdly subordinate to the rudely casual American. Previously only carefully vetted photographers had been able to take pictures of the emperor, using a telephoto lens from a distance, showing only the upper part of his body and never showing him in relation to others. Many Japanese still believed that if they looked directly into the emperor's face they would be blinded. The photograph of Hirohito with MacArthur was a masterful political stroke, of a sort. But it backfired when MacArthur's efforts to manipulate Hirohito were turned to Japan's advantage.

When the transition government in Tokyo objected to the publication of the photo, MacArthur flexed his muscles by repealing all of Japan's restrictions on publishing. This was followed by a directive on civil liberties that effectively outlawed all of Japan's secret police and internal security organs. Prince Higashikuni, another uncle of the emperor, resigned his post as head of the transition government in protest. MacArthur did this to show what he could do when provoked. The last thing he wanted was to open the way for genuine civil liberties, which would invite political change in Japan. That would be entirely too radical. From his point of view, anyone who was not ultra-right was a communist.

We can only guess at what repercussions there might have been in Japan, America and Europe if the real nature of the secret meeting with Hirohito had become known to the general public.

It is a cliché that in Asia things are rarely what they seem. Nobody puts more effort into deception than the Japanese. So it is hardly surprising that MacArthur and his staff thought they were doing the manipulating while they were being manipulated. Their mistake arose from being fascinated by the similarities between Japan and the West, when they should have focused on the differences. The differences were dangerous. The similarities were disarming, reassuring and seductive. Take, for example, the Quaker network in Japan. It comes as a surprise that Quakers, despite their small number, are sprinkled throughout Japanese society, and have remarkable leverage.

Let us begin with General Bonner Fellers. He was not just the greeter in the embassy portico. Fellers was an unusual army officer with interesting connections. Through his family he had ties to a Japanese diplomat, Terasaki Hidenari, who was riding in one of the black Daimlers in Hirohito's motorcade on that day. Both Fellers and Terasaki were intelligence officers. "Terry" Terasaki had held the senior post of first secretary at the Japanese Embassy in Washington at the time of Pearl Harbor. He and his American wife and daughter were interned, swapped for other diplomats, then spent the war years miserably in Japan. Now Terasaki had been transferred to the Imperial Household organization, which took care of all practical matters for the emperor and the imperial family. Essentially, his job was to act as Hirohito's personal liaison with General Fellers and General MacArthur.

Terry was perfect for the job. He loved America and knew it well. Bonner Fellers was a cousin of Terry's American wife, Gwen Harold, who came from a long line of Quakers. Bonner Fellers had attended a Quaker college in Indiana, where he became friends with Japanese Quaker exchange students. Two of these, Watanabe Yuri and Kawaii Michiko, became leading educators in Japan and had palace connections. In postwar Tokyo they were helping Fellers carry out his secret mission. In short, Fellers and Terasaki were part of a network of Quakers and near-Quakers that reached from Herbert Hoover at one end deep into the imperial palace at the other, to the personal entourage of Hirohito's mother, Dowager Empress Sadako, and other members of the imperial family. A number of Japanese men in the ruling hierarchy, who were themselves Buddhist or Shinto, had Christian wives. So the inner core of an aggressively warlike Buddhist-Shinto state, in the volatile 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, had a nucleus of Christians, many of them Quaker pacifists. They influenced England and America greatly between the wars. They did not have enough power to prevent the war, but they tried to stop it. Some of these palace officials used their links to Swiss, British and American Quakers to send secret peace feelers to London and Washington by way of Switzerland. After the war, they intervened in every way they could to save the imperial family from humiliation and prosecution as war criminals. While this may seem commendable in some respects, it had a dark side. The same network was used very cynically by Bonner Fellers and others to achieve MacArthur's personal objectives, and those of his conservative backers.