On June 1, 1999, an American Airlines MD-80 crashed off the far end of a runway in Little Rock, Arkansas. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the media began to investigate the accident. There were questions about the airplane's control surfaces and thrust reversers, but the central question became "Why did the pilot land at Little Rock in the face of what was later determined to be a level 6 thunderstorm?" Recordings and interviews revealed that the pilots were aware of the storm but elected to land anyway. Two days after the crash, and after some of the facts were coming out, I was watching the reports of the accident on CNN. I heard the reporter say, "It's hard to believe, but a controller cannot tell a pilot to land or not to land their airplane, even when the controller knows about a storm." This statement, broadcast to the world, is the result of an almost universal misconception. Controllers do not control airplanes, pilots do. It is one thing to have people in the media misunderstand, but the bigger problem is that many pilots also do not understand. Many pilots fly as pilot in command but are not completely aware of the tremendous authority and responsibility that come with being the pilot in command. A 16-year-old student pilot flying for the first time solo has the decision authority over the most senior and experienced air traffic controller in the country. The misconception of this fact has had a direct influence on safety and accident rates. Pilots in general aviation especially need to reposition their view and understanding of what it means to be pilot in command.

This book first redefines pilot in command as something more than what is written in a logbook. If pilots, in fact, have an unrealistic view of being pilot in command, how can we start teaching what it is really like? The book points out that there is a difference between general aviation and airline training methods and asks the question "What are the airlines doing that we in general aviation should be doing?"

It is true that the greater experience and expertise pilots have, the less likely it is that they will be involved in an accident. So one way to have fewer accidents is to have more pilots perform like experts. How can nonexpert pilots act like experts? They can start doing what experts do. This book details what expert pilot behavior is, and then demonstrates how nonexperts can move toward expert performance. The book then outlines and gives examples of how these techniques can be put into practice during everyday flight training. Finally, the book's Appendix describes a year-long research project involving general aviation pilots who were exposed to "airline-type" decision training. This research was the first of its kind aimed at general aviation pilots in over 25 years.